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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Agnes Kole pled guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. SS 952(a), 
960(a)(1), and 963 based upon her involvement in a 
conspiracy to import heroin into the United States from 
Thailand. Thereafter, the government filed an enhanced 
penalty information under 21 U.S.C. S 851(a) in an effort to 
enhance Kole's sentence based upon a prior felony drug 
conviction in the Philippines. The district court granted the 
requested enhancement, and Kole appeals. She claims that 
the enhancement was improper because she was denied 
effective assistance of counsel in the Philippines, and 
because the Philippine legal system does not recognize the 
right to a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
A. The Prior Conviction in the Philippines 
 
On December 8, 1991, Kole, four other females, and a 
male named Lazarus Iwuchukwu ("Ike") were arrested in an 
apartment in a city in the Philippines. Ike was Kole's fiance. 
Kole and Ike lived in the apartment, but all six were 
charged with conspiracy to prepare, package and repackage 
heroin in violation of Philippine law. Police made the arrest 
after a drug courier named Jamie Williams lead them to 
Kole's apartment. Williams had been arrested in Manila as 
she was boarding a flight bound for Chicago with a false- 
bottomed suitcase containing approximately five kilograms 
of heroin. 
 
When police and Williams arrived at the condominium 
complex where Kole and Ike lived, the owner of the complex 
consented to a search and police entered Kole's apartment 
along with Williams. Once inside, the police discovered a 
blue suitcase containing heroin. Kole and Ike were captured 
after they tried to escape by jumping from a second story 
terrace. Several women who were present in the apartment 
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were also arrested and all were charged with violating 
Philippine law. 
 
The defendants, who were represented by the same 
attorney, entered pleas of not guilty and proceeded to trial 
before a judge in accordance with Philippine law. At that 
trial the police testified that the women who were arrested 
with Kole were all squatting around a suitcase and filling it 
with heroin when police entered. Kole testified in her own 
behalf. She stated that she and Ike had been awakened by 
a loud noise coming from the living room. According to 
Kole, Ike had peered from behind the door of the bedroom 
to find out what was going on when he saw a man with a 
gun who Ike claimed was trying to kill them. Kole testified 
that she and Ike attempted to escape by jumping from the 
second-floor terrace, but they were apprehended and placed 
under arrest. She insisted that she had never seen Williams 
before, and that the suitcase with the heroin had never 
been in her possession. The defendants also offered 
testimony that police had told them that they had to pay a 
bribe of $100,000 or the police would have Williams testify 
that the heroin was found in Kole and Ike's apartment. 
 
Despite the defense testimony, Judge Felix of the 
Regional Trial Court of the Philippines found both Ike and 
Kole guilty as charged though he acquitted everyone else. 
 
B. The Current Conviction, and Sentence 
 
In the instant case, Kole and a coconspirator were 
apprehended in New Jersey and charged with attempting to 
import heroin. Kole subsequently pled guilty to one count of 
conspiring to import 3.5 kilograms of heroin into the United 
States in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 942(a). Following the 
change of plea proceeding, the government filed an 
information under 21 U.S.C. S 851(a) in an effort to 
enhance Kole's sentence to a term of imprisonment of at 
least 20 years based upon her drug conviction in the 
Philippines. 
 
Kole argued that 21 U.S.C. S 851(c)(2) precluded the 
court from using the Philippine conviction to enhance her 
sentence because she had been denied a jury trial in the 
Philippines, and because her defense counsel there labored 
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under a conflict of interest that caused her to be denied 
effective assistance of counsel. Since S 851(c)(2) expressly 
bars consideration of any prior conviction that "was 
obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United 
States," Kole asserted that the sentencing court could not 
apply the mandatory minimum for repeat felony drug 
offenders contained in 21 U.S.C. S 960(b)(1)(A). 
 
The district court held a sentencing hearing, and 
scrutinized Judge Felix's opinion. The district court 
concluded that both of Kole's assertions were within the 
scope of the collateral attack allowed under 21 U.S.C. 
S 851(c)(2), but that Kole had not satisfied her burden of 
proof as to either claim. Accordingly, the court ruled that 
the Philippine conviction was a prior drug felony for 
purposes of sentencing, and sentenced Kole to the 
mandatory minimum period of incarceration (20 years) 
under 21 U.S.C. S 960(b)(1).1 This appeal followed. 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. Our standard of review is plenary. See United States 
v. Murray, 144 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing United States 
v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1993). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although we refer to the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 
U.S.C. S 960 as an enhancement, we note that Kole's offense level was 
calculated as 37, and she was in criminal history category I. Therefore, 
the "normal" sentencing range under the Guidelines would have been 
210 to 262 months incarceration even without a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 20 years. Ironically, the sentence that Kole actually received 
pursuant to the enhancement of 21 U.S.C. S 851 (240 months) was in 
the middle of the range that would have governed her sentence without 
the prior conviction in the Philippines. However, that does not alter our 
analysis of the issues Kole raises in this appeal. Had the district court 
not imposed the mandatory minimum the Guidelines would have allowed 
for a sentence of 210 months instead of the 240 months she received. 
Moreover, the district court could have considered a reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility based on Kole's guilty plea. 
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II. Discussion 
 
A. The Statutory Framework 
 
21 U.S.C. S 960(b)(1)(A) provides in part: 
 
       If any person commits any of the prohibited acts set 
       forth [in S 960] after a prior conviction for a felony drug 
       offense has become final, such person shall be 
       sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 
       20 years and not more than life imprisonment . . . . 
 
This enhancement is, however, subject to the limitations 
set forth in 21 U.S.C. S 851(c)(2) which provides: 
 
       A person claiming that a [prior felony drug] conviction 
       . . . was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the 
       United States shall set forth his claim, and the factual 
       basis therefor . . . . The person shall have the burden 
       of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any 
       issue of fact raised by the response. 
 
Here, it is not disputed that Kole's conviction in the 
Philippines was for a "felony drug offense" as that term is 
used in S 960. Nor is it disputed that she was not entitled 
to a jury trial under the law of the Philippines, or that her 
defense attorney there also represented all of her  
codefendants.2 The district court ruled that, although Kole 
was not entitled to a jury trial, her Philippine conviction 
could still be used to enhance her sentence under S 960 
because the conviction was obtained in a manner that was 
consistent with notions of fundamental fairness embodied 
in the Constitution, and was therefore "not obtained in 
violation of the Constitution" as that phrase is used in 
S 851. The court also ruled that Kole had not met her 
burden of showing that her defense attorney's joint 
representation of herself and Ike deprived her of effective 
assistance of counsel. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. However, Kole limits her claim of an improper conflict to her 
attorney's 
joint representation of her and Ike. 
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B. The District Court's Analysis 
 
In rejecting Kole's claim, the district court relied upon a 
series of cases known as the "Insular Cases."3 The district 
court also relied in part upon Custis v. United States, 511 
U.S. 485 (1994), but the court rejected the government's 
argument that Custis limited the scope of attack allowed 
under S 851(c)(2). See Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. 
 
In Custis, the defendant was convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). 
Prior to trial the government notified him that it would seek 
to enhance his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) ("ACCA"). That provision 
 
       raises the penalty for possession of a firearm by a felon 
       from a maximum of 10 years . . . to a mandatory 
       minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life 
       in prison . . . if the defendant has three previous 
       convictions . . . for a violent felony or serious drug 
       offense. 
 
Custis, 511 U.S. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The defendant had a prior state court conviction for 
robbery, and two prior state court convictions for burglary. 
However, at his sentencing hearing in federal court, he 
challenged the use of two prior state court convictions 
arguing that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel in those 
prosecutions. He asserted that his attorney in those two 
cases had not advised him of a possible defense of 
voluntary intoxication, and that he would have gone to trial 
rather than plead guilty had he known of that defense. Id. 
at 488. 
 
The sentencing judge denied the challenge, and the court 
of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals reasoned that 
S 924(e) did not expressly provide for collateral attack of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 9. The "Insular Cases" refers to a group of cases 
that include Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); 
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). As noted below, these cases are 
discussed in Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 
F.2d 682-4 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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predicate enhancement convictions. The court stated that 
considerations of comity and federalism weighed against 
such collateral attacks on state convictions in federal 
proceedings and that it was impractical to allow the "fact 
intensive inquiries" necessary to resolve such a collateral 
attack. Id. at 490. The court did, however, recognize "the 
right of a defendant who had been completely deprived of 
counsel to assert a collateral attack on his prior 
convictions." Id. at 489. The Supreme Court affirmed. It 
reasoned that Congress did not intend to allow a collateral 
attack of the predicate enhancement convictions under 
S 924(c) because it had omitted any language allowing a 
defendant to do so. The Court viewed that omission in 
context with the specific grant of such a right in 21 U.S.C. 
S 851(c)(2). The Court stated: 
 
       The language of S 851(c) shows that when Congress 
       intended to authorize collateral attacks on prior 
       convictions at the time of sentencing, it knew how to 
       do so. Congress' omission of similar language in 
       S 924(e) indicates that it did not intend to give 
       defendants the right to challenge the validity of prior 
       convictions under this statute. 
 
511 U.S. at 492. Moreover, the Court reasoned that since 
Custis was still in custody on the state charges he was 
attacking, he could seek a writ of habeas corpus to review 
the prior convictions. 
 
In the district court here, the government asserted that 
the scope of the collateral attack authorized inS 851(c) was 
limited to the fact of representation, and could not be 
stretched to allow an inquiry into the quality of an 
attorney's stewardship.4 Since Kole had been represented 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In its brief before us, the government assumes arguendo that Kole can 
challenge the constitutionality of her Philippine conviction though the 
government states "neither the statute's express language -- authorizing 
challenges to `a conviction' -- nor its legislative history addresses this 
question." Appellee's Br. at 14. However, the text of the statute is so 
clear as to leave no room to doubt that a defendant in Kole's 
circumstance can collaterally challenge the constitutionality of her 
foreign conviction under 21 U.S.C. S 851(c)(2). 
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during the prosecution in the Philippines, the prosecution 
insisted that her Sixth Amendment challenge was without 
merit. The district court rejected that view stating: 
 
       The government does not explain why the boundaries 
       drawn around collateral attack in Custis, which relate 
       to collateral attack in the absence of statutory 
       authorization therefor, should be interpreted by this 
       court to be the same boundaries that apply to a 
       statutorily authorized collateral attack on an 
       extraterritorial conviction. . . . The Court rejects this 
       argument 
 
       . . . . 
 
        The government also argues that only `fundamental' 
       rights attach abroad and that Custis establishes that 
       effective assistance is not among these. The Court will 
       not give Custis such a broad application. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. Nevertheless, the district court ruled that 
Kole had not met her burden of proof as to her claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and rejected her Sixth 
Amendment claim. The court also refused to rule that the 
absence of a jury trial under the Philippine legal system 
constituted a per se bar to using that conviction to enhance 
her current sentence. Rather, the court examined the basic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Judge Alito does not agree that 21 U.S.C. S 851(c)(2) authorizes Kole to 
challenge the use of her Philippine conviction under 21 U.S.C. 
S 960(b)(1)(A). Judge Alito doubts that a conviction of a foreigner in a 
foreign court for conduct on foreign soil obtained without the 
participation by American agents can be viewed as having been 
"obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States." 21 
U.S.C. 
S 851(c)(2). Since Congress provided for foreign convictions to be counted 
under 21 U.S.C. S 960(b)(1)(A), see 21 U.S.C. SS 802(44), 960(b), he 
thinks that it would have been reasonable for Congress to have 
furnished a mechanism for challenging the reliability and fairness of 
such convictions, but he finds it difficult to construe the text of 21 
U.S.C. S 851(c)(2) as doing so. However, assuming for the sake of 
argument that Kole has a statutory or constitutional right to challenge 
the use of her Philippine conviction for present purposes, he is convinced 
that the right would not exceed the bounds set out in the court's 
opinion, and he agrees with the court that the challenge must fail. 
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principles of the Philippine legal system, the circumstances 
surrounding her conviction, and Judge Felix's decision, and 
concluded that her conviction was obtained in a manner 
that was consistent with fundamental fairness, and it 
therefore met the test of constitutionality that Congress 
intended under 21 U.S.C. S 851(c)(2). 
 
On appeal, Kole argues that the district court's 
"limitation of the application of Section 851(c)(2) to foreign 
convictions is in direct conflict with the plain meaning of 
the statute," Appellant's Br. at 30, and she again argues 
that Congress intended to exclude any foreign conviction 
that does not "comport with the United States 
Constitution." Appellant's Br. at 31. The government 
counters by arguing that the district court correctly "found 
that the right to trial by jury is not a fundamental right but 
is rather a mode of procedure guaranteed . . . in the United 
States." Appellee's Br. at 21 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
C. The Insular Cases 
 
Kole's assertion as to her right to a jury trial implicates 
a debate that the Supreme Court discussed in Board of 
Engineers v. Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1975). There, the Court 
had to determine the constitutionality of a provision of the 
law of Puerto Rico that prevented anyone who was not a 
United States citizen from obtaining a license as a civil 
engineer in Puerto Rico. In the course of striking down the 
provision, the Court noted the doctrines of incorporated 
and unincorporated territories that emerged from the 
holdings in the Insular Cases. Under those holdings, the 
Constitution applied "with full force" to"[t]erritories 
destined for statehood from the time of acquisition . . . ." Id. 
at 601. However, only " `fundamental' constitutional rights 
were guaranteed to the inhabitants" of "[t]errirtories not 
possessing that anticipation of statehood." Id. Since Puerto 
Rico was not acquired with the anticipation that it would 
become a state, "the Constitution was held not to extend Ex 
Proprio vigore to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico." Id. 
 
Here, we must decide whether the Constitution applies 
Ex Proprio vigore to the Philippines. As we note below, that 
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question was answered in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 
138 (1904). However, a brief discussion of the historical 
context in which Dorr was decided, and the background of 
the legal protections afforded under Philippine law will 
assist our inquiry into whether using Kole's Philippine 
conviction to enhance her current sentence is consistent 
with Congress' intent in enacting S 851(c)(2). 
 
D. Background of the Legal System 
in the Philippines 
 
Effective as of 1899, Spain ceded the Philippines to the 
United States under a treaty that gave the Congress of the 
United States the authority to determine the "civil rights 
and political status" of the people of the Philippines. 
Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1950). "The 
Spanish system, in force in the Philippines, gave the right 
to the accused to be tried before judges, who acted in effect 
as a court of inquiry, and whose judgments were notfinal 
until passed in review before [a superior court] with a right 
of final review . . . in the supreme court at Madrid." Dorr, 
195 U.S. at 145. In 1902, Congress created the Philippine 
Commission and authorized it "to exercise the powers of 
government" in the Philippines (the "Act of 1902"). Kepner 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 116 (1904). That legislation 
established certain requirements for any law subsequently 
enacted by the Philippine Commission.5  In doing so, 
Congress transplanted many of the protections of the Bill of 
Rights to the Philippines. For example, one of the 
provisions of the Act of 1902 prevented the Philippine 
Commission from enacting any law "which shall deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law . . . ." Id. at 117. The Act of 1902 also provided for 
certain guarantees including several guarantees for persons 
accused of crime. These included a prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to counsel, 
the right to testify in one's own behalf, as well as the right 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Independence of the Philippines was later authorized under the 
Philippine Independence Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 456 that provided for "the 
complete independence of the Philippine Islands" within ten years from 
enactment of that legislation. 
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to refrain from doing so, and a prohibition against being 
"twice put in jeopardy of punishment." Id. at 118. 
 
In Kepner, an attorney in the Philippines was charged 
with embezzlement, tried before a judge without a jury, and 
acquitted. However, the United States appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines which reversed, found 
Kepner guilty, and sentenced him to a term of 
imprisonment. Kepner appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court arguing that the appeal following his 
acquittal subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of 
the laws governing the Philippines as well as the United 
States Constitution. The government argued that the 
prohibition against double jeopardy in the Act of 1902, and 
the subsequent limitations that had been imposed by the 
Philippine Commission had to be interpreted in context 
with the system of law that prevailed before Spain ceded 
the islands to the United States. Under that law, no 
jeopardy attached in a criminal prosecution "until there 
had been a final judgment in the court of last resort." Id. at 
121. The lower courts were deemed mere "examining 
courts, having preliminary jurisdiction, and the accused 
was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had 
been passed upon in the audiencia, or supreme court, 
whose judgment was subject to review in the supreme court 
at Madrid . . . . The trial was regarded as one continuous 
proceeding." Id. 
 
The Court concluded that Congress intended to adopt "a 
well-known part of the fundamental law of the United 
States, and to give much of the beneficent protection of the 
Bill of Rights to the people of the Philippine Islands . . . ." 
Id. at 122. The Court noted that the President had 
instructed the Philippine Commission to "engraft" "some . . 
of the essential principles of American constitutional 
jurisprudence . . . upon the law of [the Philippines]." Id. at 
122. The President had charged: 
 
       the Commission should bear in mind . . . that there are 
       certain great principles of government which have been 
       made the basis of our governmental system, which we 
       deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance 
       of individual freedom, . . . that there are also certain 
       practical rules of government which we have found to 
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       be essential to the preservation of these great 
       principles of liberty and law, and that these principles 
       . . . must be established and maintained in their 
       islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, 
       however much they may conflict with the customs of 
       laws or procedure with which they may be familiar. .. . 
       Upon every . . . branch of the government of the 
       Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these 
       inviolable rules: That no person shall be deprived of 
       life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . 
 
Id. at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court 
then listed certain guarantees that it believed had to be 
included in the notion of "due process" regardless of the 
customs of the people in the Philippines. These included 
the right to speedy and public trial, the right to be informed 
of the nature of any accusation, and to confront one's 
accusers, and the right to counsel. The Court then held 
that the concept of double jeopardy guaranteed in the 
Philippines must be interpreted in view of the English 
common law and, under that system, jeopardy attached at 
the first trial. Thus, the accused could not be retried for the 
same offense following acquittal. 
 
The same day that the Court decided Kepner, it decided 
Dorr. There, the issue was whether, "in the absence of a 
statute expressly conferring the right, trial by jury was a 
necessary incident of judicial procedure in the Philippines." 
Id. The Court stated the issue as follows: 
 
       Must Congress, in establishing a system for trial of 
       crimes and offenses committed in the Philippine 
       Islands, carry to their people by proper affirmative 
       legislation a system of trial by jury? 
 
Id. at 143. The Court reviewed the history of the Philippines 
and noted several features of the Spanish legal system that 
governed those islands before they were ceded to the United 
States. The Court reasoned that, even though the 
Constitution contained no express provision as to the 
nature of the rights, if any, that Congress must extend to 
territories that the United States seeks to govern under its 
treaty power, "there may nevertheless be restrictions of so 
fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed, 
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although not expressed in so many words in the 
Constitution." Id. at 147. The Court concluded that there 
were such rights, but the right to a jury trial was not 
among them. 
 
       If the right to trial by jury were a fundamental right 
       which goes wherever the jurisdiction of the United 
       States extends, or if Congress, in framing laws for 
       outlying territory belonging to the United States, was 
       obliged to establish that system by affirmative 
       legislation, it would follow that, no matter what the 
       needs or capacities of the people, trial by jury, and in 
       no other way, must be forthwith established . . . 
 
Id. at 148. The Court held that the Constitution "does not 
require [Congress] to enact for ceded territory . . . a system 
of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and 
that the Constitution does not, without legislation, and of 
its own force, carry such right to territory so situated." Id. 
at 149. 
 
We conclude that Congress did not intend a contrary 
result when it enacted 21 U.S.C. S 851. Rather, as the 
district court concluded, Congress intended only to ensure 
fundamental fairness by excluding any conviction that was 
obtained in a manner inconsistent with concepts of 
fundamental fairness and liberty endemic in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 177 (1968), "[t]he Bill of Rights is 
evidence, at various points, of the content Americans find 
in the term `liberty' and of American standards of 
fundamental fairness." Thus, " `Due Process' expresses the 
requirement of `fundamental fairness,' " Lassiter v. 
Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, North Carolina, 
452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (inquiring into whether the Due 
Process Clause required appointed counsel for litigant in 
civil litigation). In Lassiter, the Court stated "[a]pplying the 
Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise 
which must discover what `fundamental fairness' consists 
of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant 
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that 
are at stake." Id. 
 
                                13 
  
In Duncan, the Supreme Court examined the right of a 
jury trial under the United States Constitution. 
 
       The question has been asked whether a right is among 
       those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
       which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
       institutions; whether it is basic in our system of 
       jurisprudence; and whether it is a fundamental right, 
       essential to a fair trial. 
 
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-9 (1968) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). The Court held that the right to a 
jury trial for one accused of a serious crime is so 
fundamental to our system of liberty that it is incorporated 
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and therefore applicable to state prosecutions. In doing so, 
the Court briefly commented upon the historical 
importance of that right to the "Founding Fathers" and the 
pervasive extent to which the right had been incorporated 
into the constitutions of the various states. The Court noted 
"[e]ven such skeletal history is impressive support for 
considering the right to jury trial in criminal cases to be 
fundamental to our system of justice, an importance 
frequently recognized in the opinions of this Court." Id. at 
153. The Court reasoned that the jury trial functioned in 
tandem with an independent judiciary to protect against 
abuses by the state. The interposition of a jury of lay 
persons between the accuser, and the accused checked 
abuses of power. 
 
        The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State 
       Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the 
       way in which law should be enforced and justice 
       administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal 
       defendants in order to prevent oppression by the 
       Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew 
       from history and experience that it was necessary to 
       protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to 
       eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to 
       the voice of higher authority. 
 
Id. at 155-6. Thus, the Court concluded that the concept of 
Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment included 
the right to a jury trial for serious crimes. 
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Kole's argument is bottomed upon an assumption that 
Congress could not have intended to allow a conviction that 
was obtained in violation of such a fundamental right to 
enhance a subsequent sentence in a court of the United 
States. However, this position overlooks the purpose behind 
S 960 as well as the fact that jury trials, though 
fundamental to the system of justice established under the 
United States Constitution, are nevertheless relatively 
unique to that system. 
 
       Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain 
       that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be 
       impossible without [trial by jury]. . . The question thus 
       is whether given this kind of system a particular 
       procedure is fundamental--whether, that is, a 
       procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of 
       ordered liberty. 
 
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149, n.14. Although the Court 
answered that question in the affirmative as applied to the 
American legal system, it left no doubt that other societies 
may well be able to fashion a system with no juries that is 
fundamentally fair to the accused, thus comporting with 
our concept of due process. 
 
E. Kole's Prosecution in the Philippines Was 
Consistent With The Concept of Fundamental Fairness 
Contained In The Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause 
 
In 1994, the Philippine Supreme Court issued an opinion 
which summarizes the rights of the accused under the 
Philippine legal system. In People of the Philippines v. 
Lopez, 1994 Philippine S.Ct. Lexis 5145 (1994), four men 
charged with armed robbery and murder were tried before 
a judge. During the trial, the prosecution introduced an 
eyewitness who identified each of the accused, and 
confessions that had been signed by each of them. The four 
defendants offered alibi witnesses in their defense, and the 
trial court acquitted three of the four. The convicted 
defendant appealed. The Philippine Supreme Court reversed 
that conviction and ordered that an order of acquittal be 
entered in his behalf. The Court's analysis illustrates the 
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extent to which a criminal defendant in the Philippines is 
afforded protection similar to those afforded under our own 
legal system. We refer to it at length as it is of substantial 
assistance to our inquiry into whether Kole's conviction in 
the Phillipines was consistent with concepts of fundamental 
fairness that are implicated by 21 U.S.C. S 851. 
 
The Court in Lopez noted that the trial court had 
disregarded the alibi testimony of all four defendants, but 
nevertheless properly acquitted three of the four because 
they were "merely present." The Court stated: 
 
       from the inception of the crime to its final termination, 
       they were merely bystanders and did not participate in 
       one way or another in the commission thereof . . . . The 
       mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act 
       without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not 
       enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. 
 
Lopez, 1994 Philippine S. Ct. Lexis at *16. The Court also 
examined the signed confessions that the prosecution 
introduced and concluded that those confessions should 
not have been used against any of the accused as they 
appeared to have been coerced, and obtained without 
benefit of counsel. The Court rejected the prosecution's 
claim that any such infirmity was cured because the 
confessions had been witnessed and counter-signed by a 
municipal attorney. The Court reasoned: 
 
       From the records, it can be gleaned that when 
       accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao 
       were investigated . . . they had no counsel present . . . 
       And counsel who supposedly assisted both accused 
       was . . . the Municipal Attorney of [the village]. On top 
       of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used 
       against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant 
       violations of the Constitution [of the Philippines] which 
       mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III, that: 
 
        (1) Any person under investigation . . . shall have the 
       right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to 
       have competent and independent counsel preferably of 
       his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services 
       of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights 
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       cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence 
       of counsel. 
 
        (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or 
       any other means which vitiate the free will shall be 
       used against him. . . . 
 
        (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation 
       . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against 
       him. 
 
Id. at *19-*20. The Court then elaborated upon the right to 
counsel, the right to remain silent, and the duty of 
arresting officers under the Philippine Constitution. 
 
       At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of 
       the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the 
       arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if 
       any. He shall be informed of his constitutional right to 
       remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement 
       he might make could be used against him. The person 
       arrested shall have the right to communicate with his 
       lawyer, relative, or anyone he chooses by the most 
       expedient means . . . . It shall be the responsibility of 
       the arresting officer to see to it that this is 
       accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be 
       conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel . . . . 
       The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver 
       shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of 
       counsel . . . . 
       [T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an 
       investigation, . . . . Hence, if there is no counsel at the 
       start of the custodial investigation . . . any statement 
       elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence 
       against him. . . . 
 
Id., at *21-2. The Court ruled that the prosecution had not 
met its burden of proving that the statements of the 
accused were properly obtained and therefore the 
statements should not have been admitted into evidence. 
The Court rejected the prosecution's argument that the 
propriety of the statements was corroborated by the 
signature of the village attorney who had apparently been 
present when the statements were taken. 
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       The Constitution also requires that counsel be 
       independent. Obviously he cannot be a special counsel, 
       public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a 
       municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly 
       adverse to the accused. . . . Attorney Zerna assisted 
       [the defendants] when they executed their respective 
       extrajudicial confessions . . . . As legal officer of the 
       municipality, he provides legal assistance and support 
       to the mayor . . . . He is no better than a . . . 
       prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during 
       custodial investigations. 
 
Id. at *24. The Court also noted that the circumstances 
under which the statements had been taken suggested that 
the statements had been coerced. 
 
       For, why did the investigators not inform the accused 
       of their right to remain silent and to have competent 
       and independent counsel . . . even before attempting to 
       elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did 
       the investigators not advise the accused that if they 
       could not afford the services of counsel they could be 
       provided with counsel free of charge? . . . How did 
       accused Sedigo get his `black eye' . . .? How and why 
       did accused-appellant . . . suffer a fractured rib? 
       We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered 
       questions. This Court is greatly disturbed with the way 
       the accused were treated or mistreated. In fine, we 
       cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the 
       accused and use the same against them or any of 
       them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, 
       the same must be rejected in toto. 
 
Id. at *25. Accordingly, the Court declared that the trial 
court improperly used the confessions against the 
appellant. The Court then examined the remaining evidence 
and concluded that it was not sufficient to convict the 
appellant. Even though the prosecution had produced the 
testimony of an eyewitness who identified the appellant, the 
Philippine Supreme Court ruled that the record did not 
establish sufficient opportunity to observe, nor sufficient 
indicia of reliability to convict based solely upon that 
identification. The Court ruled "the prosecution is left with 
nothing but the alleged positive identification of appellant 
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. . . by witness Salva. But this by itself does not measure 
up to the required standard of moral certainty." Id. at 26.6 
The Court ordered that a judgment of acquittal be entered. 
In doing so, the court left no doubt about the importance 
of fundamental liberty under the Philippine legal system. 
The Court stated: 
 
       [I]t is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn 
       to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the 
       fundamental rights of the accused. Men in uniform 
       who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed 
       with the fundamental rights of the accused. Men in 
       uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest 
       anybody they take fancy on, rough him up and put 
       words into his mouth. There is a living Constitution 
       which safeguards the rights of an accused, a penal law 
       which punishes maltreatment of prisoners and a 
       statute which penalizes failure to inform and accord 
       the accused his constitutional rights. 
 
Id. at 27-8. 
 
Clearly, the legal system of the Philippines seeks to guard 
the individual against official tyranny and protect individual 
liberty. Congress could not have intended S 851 to be used 
to exclude criminal convictions obtained under such a 
system merely because that sovereign provides a method of 
protecting fundamental liberties that does not include the 
right to trial by jury. 
 
       It would . . . be a form of cultural imperialism for the 
       United States to insist that it would not countenance, 
       for U.S. purposes, recognition of a foreign criminal 
       judgment which came from a legal culture which did 
       not employ the jury. 
 
United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 
1992) (Pollak, J.). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Though the Court spoke of proof to a "moral certainty" it does not 
appear that the standard of proof needed to convict an accused in the 
Philippines differs from the "reasonable doubt" standard. The Court also 
stated "[w]ith the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of 
accused- 
appellant . . . beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal should follow as a 
matter of course." Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
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Here, Judge Felix's opinion reflects the judicial 
independence and respect for the rights of the accused that 
the Philippine Supreme Court speaks of in Lopez. Judge 
Felix noted that the police who searched Kole's apartment 
did not have a search warrant, but allowed the seized drugs 
into evidence because the owner of the condominium 
complex gave police written consent to search, and because 
police feared that the suspects were about to leave the 
jurisdiction. App. at 94. However, even after admitting the 
physical evidence, the trial judge was so skeptical of much 
of the testimony of the police and their informant, that he 
acquitted four of the defendants who were tried with Kole. 
App. at 106 ("[t]he act imputed by the prosecution on the 
group . . . is very much not in accord with the natural 
course of things and human experiences, so that it evokes 
serious doubt on the truth of the offense charged."). 
 
However, despite his skepticism the trial judge did accept 
some of the prosecution's testimony stating that "[the 
informant's] testimony was not completely discredited." 
App. at 107. In doing so, he applied the maxim so familiar 
to our own system of jurisprudence that a "witness may be 
disbelieved in some facts but may be believed in other facts. 
. . ." Id. He also noted that the mere presence of some of the 
accused did not establish their guilt. App. at 110. However, 
he concluded that the government had met its burden of 
proof as to the guilt of Kole, and Ike, because they were in 
"full control and management" of the room where the 
heroin was found, and because he did not accept their 
explanation of their flight when the police entered their 
apartment. App. at 107, 108. 
 
Judge Felix's opinion reflects the kind of careful, 
searching analysis of evidence that one would expect from 
a trial judge in the United States. The fact that Kole was 
denied a jury trial under the jurisdiction where she 
obtained her "prior conviction for a felony drug offense" in 
no way undermines her conviction there. 
 
The text of 21 U.S.C. S 960 reflects a congressional intent 
to significantly increase sentences for drug offenders with 
prior convictions for felony drug offenses. Repeat drug 
offenders are clearly more culpable than first time 
offenders, and the enhanced sentences required under 
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S 960 serve to incapacitate and punish those who have 
continued their involvement with drug trafficking despite 
prior prosecution. Given Congress' concern, it would not be 
logical to limit the enhancement to those persons who had 
been convicted of a prior drug felony (or its equivalent) only 
in the United States. This is particularly true in view of the 
conduct included under S 960. 21 U.S.C. S 960(a)(1) states 
"any person who . . . knowingly or intentionally imports or 
exports a controlled substance . . . shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b)." (emphasis added). We do not 
think that Congress enacted a law that was intended to 
reach persons involved in international drug trafficking and 
then limited enhanced penalties to those persons who had 
previously been convicted in a court in the United States. 
That is inconsistent with Congress' attempt to reach those 
involved in importing or exporting controlled substances. 
Yet, since the United States Constitution does not apply to 
any foreign sovereign, that would be the result of adopting 
Ms. Kole's argument. 
 
F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Kole also argues that use of the Philippine conviction 
violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel because her 
trial attorney labored under an irreconcilable conflict of 
interest that prevented him from effectively representing 
her. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), 
the Court established a two-part test for evaluating a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel and we apply it here. 
Under Strickland, a defendant must show that "counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Id. If defendant is able to make that 
showing, he or she must then establish that counsel's 
dereliction prejudiced the defendant. Where the claim rests 
upon an alleged conflict of interest, defendant"must 
identify something that counsel chose to do or not do, as to 
which he had conflicting duties, and must show that the 
course taken was influenced by that conflict." Vance v. 
Lehman, 64 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Burger v. 
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); United States v. Gambino, 788 
F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1986). In other words, the defendant 
must "show some actual conflict of interest that adversely 
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affected his counsel's performance in order to prevail." 
United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 88 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
 
Here, Kole alleges that the joint representation created a 
simultaneous duty to represent Ike that prevented her 
defense attorney from distinguishing between her 
involvement and his. See Appellant's Br. at 26. Her 
argument suggests that her attorney could have attempted 
to equate Kole's role with that of the codefendants who were 
acquitted rather than being lumped with her fiance. 
However, "hindsight rationalization alone cannot support a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." United States v. 
Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1984). In 
Auerbach, the court held that joint representation of a 
father and son charged with various firearms offenses 
resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. The joint trial 
allowed the prosecution to elicit testimony of the son's prior 
felony conviction, and "exacerbated a situation in which the 
sins of the son were visited on the father." Id. at 1161. The 
court concluded that "[t]he record . . . reveal[ed] that 
counsel was in the dilemma of either pursuing or 
abandoning defenses and tactics that would help one 
defendant but hurt the other." Id. The record of Kole's 
conviction in the Philippines does not reflect a similar 
dilemma. Kole's attorney mounted a vigorous attack on the 
credibility of the police, and informant Williams. As noted 
above, he was able to raise serious questions as to the 
credibility of the prosecutor's witnesses. In fact, the trial 
judge did not credit substantial portions of the 
prosecution's case. 
 
Moreover, the appendix filed in this court contains a 
"Demurrer to Evidence" that defense counselfiled following 
trial, and prior to Judge Felix issuing his opinion. See 
Appendix 112-135. In that demurrer Kole's attorney argues 
that all of the physical evidence must be suppressed based 
upon the warrantless search, the lack of credibility of the 
prosecution witnesses including the police, the chemist's 
expertise and bias, Jacqueline Williams' open case with the 
police, and the likelihood of her bias based upon asserted 
promises that the case would be dismissed if she 
cooperated against Kole. After arguing that the physical 
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evidence should be suppressed, and attacking the 
remaining evidence, counsel argued: 
 
       There being no independent object evidence for the 
       prosecution . . . the prosecution is left with no other 
       evidence to prove the guilt of the accused other than 
       the incredible, hearsay and inconsistent testimonies 
       which are insufficient to sustain a judgment of 
       conviction. 
 
App. at 131 (emphasis in original). 
 
There is no irreconcilable tension in defense counsel's 
strategy. Indeed, Kole's attorney would have been hard 
pressed to draw distinctions between her involvement and 
Ike's while arguing that the police and Williams were lying 
about finding evidence inside of their apartment. As noted 
above, "an actual conflict of interest occurs when counsel 
cannot use his best efforts to exonerate one defendant for 
fear of implicating the other." United States v. Unger, 665 
F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir. 1981). Kole argues that her 
situation is similar to that of the appellant in Unger. See 
Appellant's Br. at 27. We disagree. The defense strategy 
used by Kole's trial counsel did not prevent him from using 
his best efforts to represent Kole for fear of implicating Ike. 
 
Although Kole asserts her Philippine attorney could have 
used a different strategy had he not also represented Ike, 
she has not met her burden of proving that she was 
prejudiced by the joint representation. Moreover, we do not 
think that the strategy actually adopted compromised her 
defense. Since Kole and Ike occupied the apartment and 
had equal access to the suitcase with the heroin, a 
coordinated attack on the prosecution's cooperating 
witness, and upon the police was strategically sound. This 
is not the situation presented in Unger. There, defense 
counsel was appointed to jointly represent a husband and 
wife accused of kidnaping. They plead guilty, and defense 
counsel attempted to represent both at sentencing. 
Thereafter, the wife collaterally attacked her sentence under 
21 U.S.C. S 2255. The court of appeals ruled that Crystal 
Unger had been denied effective assistance of counsel at 
her sentencing because her husband had provided a 
statement admitting that he was primarily responsible for 
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causing the infant's injuries. Obviously, counsel could not 
exploit that concession on behalf of Mrs. Unger while also 
representing her husband. Ms. Kole's situation is a far cry 
from the actual conflict in Unger. It is the particular 
circumstances of a joint prosecution of husband and wife, 
rather than the fact of the relationship, that creates any 
conflict of interest between spouses in a joint prosecution. 
Although the circumstances could be such that a conflict of 
interest would flow from the relationship of husband and 
wife, this is not such a case. Kole has not established such 
circumstances existed when she was convicted in the 
Philippines. Judge Felix did conclude that Kole and Ike had 
joint control over the apartment, and joint access to the 
heroin inside of it, but the conflict of interest Kole 
complains of is more a creature of hindsight than of record. 
 
G. Due Process Violation 
 
Kole also alleges that Judge Felix's findings of fact, and 
credibility determinations somehow denied her due process 
of law thus bringing that conviction under the prohibition 
of 18 U.S.C. S 851(c)(2). She argues that the record does not 
support Judge Felix's conclusion that the blue suitcase 
containing the heroin was found in the bedroom she shared 
with Ike. She also attacks various findings Judge Felix 
made based upon his credibility determinations. See 
Appellant's Br. at 39-44. 
 
A sentencing judge denies a defendant the due process of 
law when he or she specifically considers "misinformation 
of a constitutional magnitude" in fashioning a sentence. 
United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155. 163 (3rd Cir. 
1992). The trial judge obviously credited enough of the 
testimony of Ms. Williams to conclude that the heroin was 
found in Kole's apartment. That conclusion is corroborated 
by the testimony of the police, and even by Kole's flight 
following the police entry into her apartment because the 
court rejected Kole's explanation of that flight.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We note the testimony as to the location of the heroin was such that 
Kole's attorney assumed that fact was established if the prosecution 
witnesses were believed. He argued that "Sr. Insp. Lazo and Ms. Williams 
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       Factual matters considered as a basis for sentence 
       must have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond 
       mere allegation and must either alone or in the context 
       of other available information, bear some rational 
       relationship to the decision to impose a particular 
       sentence. 
 
United States v. Matthews, 773 F.2d 48, 51 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
Measured against this standard, Kole's due process 
argument fails whether her challenge is based upon 
inaccurate information that Judge Felix relied upon, or the 
district court's reliance upon the challenged Philippine 
conviction. 
 
Kole's due process argument is really little more than a 
challenge to Judge Felix's credibility determinations. 
Credibility determinations are the unique province of a fact 
finder, be it a jury, or a judge sitting without a jury. Where 
the record supports a credibility determination, it is not for 
an appellate court to set it aside. See Hoots v. 
Pennsylvania, 703 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1983) (it is the 
"responsibility of the appellate court to accept the ultimate 
factual determination of the fact finder unless that 
determination either is completely devoid of minimum 
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility or 
bears no rational relationship to supportive evidentiary 
data."). Judge Felix carefully considered the testimony 
before him. Although Kole argues otherwise, it is clear that 
her Philippine prosecution comported with the minimum 
standards of due process as reflected in the thorough and 
incisive opinion of the district court. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district 
court's imposition on Kole of an enhanced sentence of 
twenty years under 21 U.S.C. S 960(b)(1)(A). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
testified . . . the police . . . went inside the master's bedroom which 
was 
opened and saw people squatting and transferring heroin . . . which 
testimonies are almost identical in the use of words and substance, 
thereby introducing suspicion that such testimonies were coached 
and/or rehearsed in all material points." App. at 129 (emphasis in 
original). 
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